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Abstract. Understanding the role (if any) that the concept of `representation' might play in
cognitive science is a fundamental problem facing the emerging framework of embodied, situated,
dynamical cognition. To make progress in this endeavor, here I follow the approach proposed by
one of the most inuential representational skeptics, Randall Beer: instead of arguing only on
the basis of intuitions and speculations, building articial models of agents capable of minimally
cognitive behaviors, and then assessing whether their internal states can be considered to involve
`representations' in any meaningful sense. In this spirit, I operationalize the concept of representing
as 'standing in' and I look for the presence of representations in embodied agents which have to
solve simple categorization tasks. In a rst experiment, no representations can be found, supporting
representational skepticism, but the fact that agents which do not possess internal states reach
high performance casts doubt on the relevance of the task for the issue of representations. A simple
modication of the task makes it more `representationally-hungry', and in this case successful
agents are found to possess internal states that do qualify as representations. I conclude the paper
by discussing the benets of reconciling the embodied-dynamical approach to cognition with the
notion of representation.
1 Introduction
In the last quarter century the basic assumptions of Cognitive Science have been questioned by several
perspectives: the various approaches of connectionism (Rumelhart et al., 1986b), new robotics (Brooks,
1991), articial life (Parisi et al., 1990; Steels and Brooks, 1994), adaptive behavior research (Meyer and
Wilson, 1990), and dynamical systems (Port and van Gelder, 1995; van Gelder, 1998) have questioned
in several ways the classical conception of cognition as the manipulation of symbols according to formal
rules. The result is that nowadays a new framework is emerging, which we can call 'Embodied Cognitive
Science'. According to this new framework the mechanisms explaining cognition are non-symbolic or
sub-symbolic, and cognition itself consists in the adaptation of an agent to its environment, which in
turn crucially depends on the interaction dynamics between the agent and the environment it lives in,
which can include artifacts and other agents (Bechtel et al., 1998; Pfeifer and Scheier, 1999).
Several of the proponents of this new approach have not only questioned the idea of cognition as sym-
bol manipulation, but the concept of `representation' itself (e.g. Brooks, 1991; Thelen and Smith, 1994;
Wheeler, 1994; Kelso, 1995; Beer, 1995; van Gelder, 1995; Harvey, 1996; Cli and Noble, 1997; Keijzer,
2001). On the other hand, many other researchers working within the embodied cognition framework
keep using a representational language (e.g. Scheier et al., 1998; Nol and Marocco, 2001; Sugita and
Tani, 2005; Gigliotta and Nol, 2008). And several explicit defenses of the concept of representations
have been proposed not only by `traditional' cognitive scientists, but also by active supporters of the
embodied cognition framework (e.g. Clark and Toribio, 1994; Clark, 1997b; Bechtel, 1998; Clark and
Grush, 1999; Markman and Dietrich, 2000a,b; Prinz and Barsalou, 2000; Spencer and Schoner, 2003;
Steels, 2003a). Indeed, the debate about the utility of the concept of representation for cognitive science
is ongoing (e.g. Chemero, 2001; Dreyfus, 2002; Haselager et al., 2003; Dietrich and Markman, 2003;
Wheeler, 2005; Ramsey, 2007; Garzon, 2008; Gallagher, 2008).
Recently, one of the most inuential proponents of both the dynamical approach to cognition and of
the skepticism on the notion of representation, Randal Beer (Beer, 1995, 2000), has rightly noticed that
2the debate on representations has been mostly based on philosophical argumentations, intuitions, and
analogies, rather than on concrete models (Beer, 1996). To overcome this problem, Beer proposed using
simple evolutionary simulations of adaptive behavior as a means to ground such a debate on concrete
models relying on as few a-priori assumptions as possible. Beer's idea was to construct simple idealized
models of 'minimally cognitive behavior' as \prosthetically controlled thought experiments" (Dennett,
1994; Bedau, 2002) with which to explore the fundamental issues posed by the embodied cognition
framework: in particular, the issue of representations.
In line with this view, in a recent seminal paper (Beer, 2003b), Beer developed a detailed analysis of
an articial agent capable of exhibiting categorical perception behavior using exclusively methods and
concepts of dynamical systems theory. The provision of a detailed explanation of a minimally cognitive
behavior in dynamical terms and without relying on the concept of representation is rightly considered
by Beer as a substantial contribution in favor of representational skepticism. But notwithstanding the
importance of his work, Beer did not bother to check whether in fact his evolved agent's internal states
could be considered as representations. In this paper, I try to complete Beer's work: i.e. I assess whether
or not (and, eventually, in which conditions) minimally cognitive agents actually use representations. 1
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section I briey discuss the shortcomings
of Beer's representational skepticism. In section 2 I describe my replication of the simulations of Beer
(2003b). In section 4 I operationalize the basic denition of representations described above in the
context of the computational model under investigation and I assess the presence of representations in
my best evolved agent, with negative results. In section 5, I present a control simulation with which I
check the relevance of the chosen task for the representational debate, again, with negative results. In
section 6 I make a simple modication of the task to make it more relevant, and I assess the presence of
representations in the best evolved agent in this task, this time with positive results. Finally, in section 7
I discuss the relevance of the presented work with respect to the debate on representations and in section
8 I draw my conclusions.
2 Minimally-cognitive agents and representations
The dynamical analyses of a minimally-cognitive agent exhibiting categorization behavior presented in
Beer (2003b) are truly impressive: a brilliant example of the application of the dynamical system approach
to cognition. Nonetheless, some perplexities remain about the conclusions that Beers wants to draw on
the issue of representations. Several of the commentators of Beer's target article questioned the relevance
of Beer's work on the ground that the analyzed model was too simple, and that the same kind of analysis
might not scale up to more complex agents (e.g. Edelman, 2003; Clark, 2003). While there might be some
truth in this kind of criticism, as I will show later, just asserting that more complex cognitive skills need
to be supported by representations is simply begging the question. The need for representations, as Beer
rightly argues in his response (Beer, 2003a), is something which must be demonstrated, not established
a-priori.
But even if one accepts to play Beer's game, an even more compelling perplexity arises: do Beer's
evolved agents really not possess any representation or have representations simply not been looked
for? In fact, though Beer's declared strategy was to \evolve agents on tasks that are rich enough to
be representationally interesting, then examine whether or not these agents actually use representations
in their operation" (Beer, 2003a, pag. 304, emphasis added), Beer's analyses did not include such a
careful examination. While a lot of eort was made in providing an impressive amount of dynamical
analyses, Beer never explicitly and concretely tried to assess whether representational content might be
ascribed to his agent's internal states. Though apparently odd, this is quite typical from researchers in
the adaptive behavior community which are critics of representations. Most probably, this is due to the
fact that usually these critics consider the notion of internal representation too vague and ill-dened
to support such an investigation (Harvey, 1996). Beer seems to share this concern when he says that
\`representation' is far too malleable a label" (Beer, 2003b, pag. 237) and that \...this methodology
will only work if advocates of particular sorts of representation are willing to specify clear criteria for
identifying them" (Beer, 2003a, pag. 304).
3Notwithstanding the perplexities of the representational skeptics, close scrutiny of the debate over
representations reveals not only that denitions of representation have indeed been given, but also that
there is a signicant amount of consensus with respect to the basic idea. In fact, all the participants
in the debate agree that not all internal states are representations (one of the skeptic's most pressing
concerns), and that the simple fact that an internal state correlates with some external feature2 is not
sucient either. Rather, for an internal state to be a representation the correlation must be functional
to the agent's behavior: in other words, the internal state must contribute to the agent's behavior in a
way that is adaptive to what it correlates with. For example, Clark claims: \...standing-in requires not
mere correlation, but adaptively or functionally intended correlation" (Clark, 1997b, pag. 464, emphasis
added). In the same spirit, Bechtel says: \...reliable covariation is not sucient... the additional compo-
nent is that a representation has as its function the carrying of specic information" (Bechtel, 1998, pag.
298, emphasis added). Surprisingly, Beer himself seems to be aware of this consensus as he states: \The
basic idea is that these internal representations stand in for (re-present) external things in a way that
both carries a coherent semantic interpretation and plays a direct causal role in the cognitive machinery"
(Beer, 2003b, pag. 237). In my view, all these characterizations clearly convey the same basic idea, and
are also detailed enough to make the search of internal representations in an simple model agent feasible.
Hence, it is time to complete what Beer has left undone: i.e. assess whether minimally cognitive agents
actually use internal representations3 or not.
3 Methods
I replicate the categorization experiments presented in Beer (1996, 2003b), with some modications
to irrelevant details (regarding the network's constraints and the genetic algorithm). The agent has a
circular body with a diameter of 30 and is situated in an environment of size 400 x 275 (Fig. 1a). The
agent's `eye' consists of 7 rays of maximum length 220 uniformly distributed over a visual angle of =6.
The intersection between a ray and an object causes an input to be injected into the corresponding
sensory node, with a magnitude inversely proportional to the distance to the object. When the rays are
at their maximum length, no input is injected, while the maximum input (1) is injected for rays of zero
length. The agent can move horizontally as objects fall from above with horizontal velocity proportional
to the sum of the opposing forces produced by two motors (maximum speed = 5). The behavior of the
agent is controlled by a network with 7 input units (ray sensors) sending connections to 3 fully-recurrent
internal units which in turn send connections to the 2 motor units (Fig. 1b). All neurons, including the
input ones, are leaky integrators: their activation is updated according to the following equation:
oi = io
(t 1)
i + (1  i)(1 + e (i+
P
wijoj)) 1 (1)
where i is a time constant, i is the bias (or the input injected to the sensor in the case of input
neurons), and wij is the weight from neuron j to neuron i.
The parameters of the neural controllers are evolved using a standard genetic algorithm. All the
weights, biases and time constants are encoded in the genotype of evolving individuals as 8-bits strings.
Weights and biases are normalized in [ 5; 5], time constants are normalized in [0; 1]. Agents are evolved
for their ability to catch circles and avoid diamonds. Each individual is tested for 50 trials, half of which
include a circle and half a diamond. In each trial, the agent starts from the middle of the environment
and an object falls straight down with a random initial horizontal oset in the range [ 50; 50] (with
respect to the agent) and a vertical velocity of 3. Circular objects have a diameter of 30 and diamonds
have a side of 30.
The tness of individuals is computed as f(x) =
P
pi
N , where N is the total number of trials (50)
and pi = 1   di for a circular object and pi = di for diamonds; di is the horizontal distance between
the centers of the object and the agent when their vertical separation goes to 0 in trial i, and is clipped
to maxDist and normalized in [0; 1]; maxDist is 1.5 times the sum of the radii of the object and the
agent (during post-evolutionary tests, I also calculate a discrete trial performance, pdi, which equals 1 if
pi > 0:5, and 0 otherwise). The population is composed of 100 individuals. The 20 best genotypes of each
generation are allowed to reproduce by generating 5 copies each, with 3% of their bits re-placed with
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Fig. 1. Experiment's set-up. (a) The agent (gray circle at the bottom) move horizontally while objects (black
circle on the top) fall from above. The agent has 7 distal sensors (black lines). (B) The architecture of the neural
network.
a new randomly selected value (with elitism: i.e. in each generation the best individual of the previous
generation is retained without mutations). Evolution lasts 250 generations.
The basic results of the target experiments were successfully replicated: over 10 evolutionary runs
the best evolved agent reached a tness of 0.999 on the 50 evaluation trials, and a mean performance of
0.9936 when tested on 1000 new randomly generated trials (discrete average performance = 1). This is an
almost perfect performance, which is even slightly higher than that of Beer's best evolved agent, which
reached an average of 0.9708 on 10000 test trials. Since the focus of the present paper is on searching for
internal representations, I will not provide a detailed analysis of agent's behavior. Suce it to say that,
behaviorally, the strategy of our best evolved agent looks qualitatively very similar to that of the agent
analyzed in Beer (2003b), being based on an initial foveation of the falling object, an active scanning of
it through back and forth movements, and then a decrease of the amplitude of the scanning until circles
are centered or a large avoidance movement with respect to diamonds.
4 In search of the Representational Grail
Now that we have a embodied agent that is able to categorize objects thanks to its dynamical interactions
with the environment, we want to assess whether the agent's internal states can be characterized as rep-
resentations. In order to do that we must operationalize the basic, well accepted notion of representation
that we have discussed in section 2. According to such a notion, in order to qualify as representational an
internal state must: (a) tend to correlate with some relevant (for the agent) feature of the environment
and (b) contribute to agent's behavior in a way that is functional (adaptive) to the feature with which
it correlates. Fortunately, the simplicity of the experimental set-up makes the task of operationalizing
these two requisites relatively easy.
Since all the agent has to do is catching circles and avoiding diamonds, and since the agent's simple
neural network cannot do very complex perceptual computations, the most plausible (if not the only)
features that our agent might represent are just circles and diamonds. Hence, for checking criterion
(a) we must look at whether any of the agent's internal states do indeed reliably correlate with circles
and diamonds. The agent control system is composed by the input, hidden, and output units and by
the connection weights (linking input-to-hidden, hidden-to-hidden, and hidden-to-output). The inputs
constitute the agent's sensory system that is directly activated by the objects in the environment, and
the outputs constitute the agent's motor system that directly aects behavior. Hence, inputs and outputs
constitute the interface between the system and the environment and cannot be considered part of its
internal machinery. The connection weights are what determine the behavior of the system given the
input received from the environment. Since they never change during the whole `life' of the agent, they
5do not correlate with anything, and hence they cannot represent anything. The only things that are
internal to the network and that do change during the agent interactions with the environment are the
activations of the hidden units. Hence, for checking criterion (a) we only need to look at the activations
of the 3 hidden units and check whether they do correlate or not with circles and diamonds (since the
pattern of the activations of the 3 hidden units is the only thing that is internal to the agent and that
changes through time, I will refer to that pattern in each point in time as the `internal state' of the agent
at that point in time)4.
Fig. 2 shows the trajectories of the internal state of the best evolved agent during 50 tests, half of
which involve interacting with circles and the other half with diamonds. While individual trajectories
during dierent interactions with the same kind of object vary depending on the object's initial o-
set, the agent's internal state at the end of the trial does correlate very well with the category of the
object with which the agent has interacted (and with the action that the agent has performed: catch
or avoid). In fact, the vector of the activations of the hidden units is very similar every time the agent
caught a circle (the centroid of end points of the trajectories with circles is < 0:0000; 0:0002; 0:8741 >)
and very similar every time the agent avoided a diamond (in this case, the centroid's coordinates are
< 0:8190; 0:0186; 0:7542 >); but the centroids in the two cases are quite dierent, in particular with
respect to the activation of the rst hidden unit.
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Fig. 2. Correlation test for the categorization experiment. Graphs report the trajectories of agent's internal state
during trials with circles (a) and diamonds (b). Each dimension corresponds to the activation of one of the three
hidden units. Stars represent the starting point (equal for all the trials), while lled circles represent end points
Now that we have discovered a signicant correlation between the patterns of activation of the
hidden units at the end of the trial and the category to which objects in the environment belong, we
have a plausible candidate for a representation: that is, the centroid of the trajectories' end-points for
each category. In order to check whether these internal states can be considered real representations
we must ensure that this correlation is functionally signicant, as required by criterion (b) above. How
can criterion (b) be operationalized in a simple embodied system like our own? Since the requirement
is that the candidate representation must contribute to the agent's behavior in a way that is adaptive
with respect to what it is supposed to represent, the most straightforward way to operationalize this
criterion is to impose the candidate representation in the agent's `brain' and check whether the resulting
behavior is functional with respect to what is supposed to be represented. In particular, I implement
this by imposing the candidate representations before the interaction with the object has started (i.e.
at the beginning of the trial). If the resulting behavior is (immediately) adaptive with respect to the
supposedly represented feature (in our case object's category), than the criterion is met, and we can say
to have found `real' representations; otherwise, the criterion is not met, and we have discovered that our
6agent does not represent anything after all, as Beer suggested5. I run 50 random tests (half with circles
and half with diamonds) in which I initialize the activations of the internal neurons of the agent to the
centroid of the nal patterns of the category of the object with which the agent has to interact (in this
way, the agent is provided with the candidate representation of the correct category a few time steps
{about 10{ before the falling object can impact the sensors). All other units are initialized, as usual, to
0.
The results of such a test are quite interesting. Imposing the candidate representations onto the agent
before it can interact with the object does not facilitate the agent. On the contrary, average performance
is disrupted to chance level: 0.5 for both the continuous and the discrete measure. In fact, though starting
with dierent internal states, agent's behavior is almost identical in both circles and diamond trials: the
agent always move right, thus always producing an avoidance behavior irrespective of the category of
the falling object (thus scoring 1 with all the diamonds and 0 with all the circles). The reason is that
even though the regions in the internal state space correlating with the two categories of objects seem to
correspond to two attractors, from which the internal dynamics tend not to move (Fig. 3), the attractor
correlating with circles does not, by itself, make the agent behave in a way which is appropriate to circles,
i.e. staying still while centering the falling circle. Rather, it is only when the internal state is coupled
with the appropriate agent-environment dynamical interactions that the whole system composed by the
state, the agent, and the environment produces the appropriate behavior. Hence, the states correlating
with the presence of circles cannot be considered a representation of circles, since they satisfy only one
(the rst) of the two criteria for representationhood.
At this point, a strenuous defender of representations might claim that even if we have not found a
representation of `circles' at least we have found a representation of `diamonds'. This would be misleading
because there is substantial agreement in the literature that for an internal state to be a representation it
must be part of a system of representations in which dierent states represent dierent things. If this is
not the case, then the use of the notion of representation is of no value. Hence, we are forced to conclude
that the internal states of our model do not have representational value. In fact, we cannot ascribe to
those internal states any coherent semantic interpretation since they cannot appropriately guide behavior
independently from their appropriate coupling with the agent-environment interactions.
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Fig. 3. Representation test for the categorization experiment. Graphs report the trajectories of agent's internal
state during trials with circles (a) and diamonds (b). In this test, the starting point for circles is the candidate for
the `circle' representation (at < 0:0000; 0:0002; 0:8741 >), while the starting point for diamonds is the candidate
for the `diamond' representation (at < 0:8190; 0:0186; 0:7542 >)
75 Representational 'Hungryness'
Now that we have assessed that no representational role can be ascribed to our minimally cognitive
agent, a doubt can still come to mind (acknowledged by Beer himself): is the chosen task suciently
representationally-hungry (Clark and Toribio, 1994) to \fully engage questions regarding the utility of
representational thinking" (Beer, 2003b, pag. 239)? Or is it too simple to be relevant for the debate, as
some of Beer's critics (e.g. Edelman, 2003; Clark, 2003) suggest? With respect to this important issue
Beer seems to betray his own methodological rigor. In fact, he addresses the issue at the same level of his
critics, i.e. with verbal argumentations and by appealing to intuitions (Beer, 2003b,a), instead of trying
to ground the debate on concrete modeling work. In fact, even though we currently have no way to
measure `representational hungryness', at least we can set a clear, operational threshold for what cannot
be said to be representationally hungry in any meaningful sense: a task is surely not representationally
hungry if it can be solved by agents which do not possess internal states.
In the spirit of the minimally cognitive behavior approach, with our operationalized threshold we can
start to ground the debate on (minimal) representational hungryness on concrete simulations rather than
on intuitions and verbal argumentations. In order to do this, I re-ran the same evolutionary experiments
described above with the only dierence that in this case agents' neural network has no hidden units, and
the 7 input units are directly connected to the 2 output units. Since the only thing that is `internal' (in
between the inputs and the outputs) to such a network is the weight connection matrix, which does not
change during the agent's `life' and hence cannot correlate with anything, the agents of this simulation
have no internal states: hence they cannot, by denition, have internal representations.
The results of these simulation are quite illuminating: over 10 evolutionary runs the best evolved
agent reached a tness of 0.97 on the 50 evaluation trials. The average performance of this agent on a
test with 1000 new randomly generated trials was 0.9027, with a discrete average performance of 0.93.
This means that the agent mis-categorize the object only in 7% of the trials. All errors happen with
circles, in particular when they start to fall at the very left with respect to the agent. In those cases,
the agent simply ignores the object: it moves right from the very beginning, immediately loose `visual'
contact with the object, and ends the trial with an erroneous `avoid'. Every time the agent interacts with
the object, it correctly categorizes it, catching circles and avoiding diamonds.
From these results, it is clear that the task cannot really be considered suitable to assess the utility of
representational talk, as it can be solved by an agent that has no internal states and, a fortiori, cannot
have any internal representations. Note that this does not mean that we have to raise the threshold for
considering a behavior cognitively interesting so that categorical perception does not qualify. Catego-
rization is surely one of the most (if not the most: Harnad, 2005) fundamental cognitive phenomena,
and since our agents are able to produce a minimal form of categorization they do qualify as minimally
cognitive. But if agents which cannot possess representations are able to solve the task, this means that
the task, though relevant for cognitive science, is not relevant to the representational issue. In fact, this
is indeed another conrmation of one of the main contributions that embodied cognition research has
provided to cognitive science: namely, the realization that at least some of the problems which, from a
classical stance, might seem to require the use of internal representations can in fact be solved by relying
on pure sensory-motor, non representational strategies (Brooks, 1991; Nol, 1998; Pfeifer and Scheier,
1999). As discussed above, to be relevant not only for cognitive science in general, but for the debate on
representations in particular, a task should at least be such that it cannot be solved by agents without
internal states. Again, this does not mean that we have to stop discussing the issue until we will manage
to evolve agents that are able to perform extremely complicated tasks requiring, for example, abstract
thinking and problem solving abilities or the use of language, as Beer's critics seemed to suggest. Even
though it is always dicult to establish a priori whether a task is solvable or not by purely sensory-motor
strategies, we can use our evolutionary simulations to nd this out `empirically'.
To do so, we just need to nd the simplest modication of the task we have used so far that makes it
pass the operational threshold we have just set for representational hungryness: i.e. we need to modify
it so that it cannot be solved by agents that have no internal states. One possible way of achieving this
might consist in making the task require some (minimal) form of memory: if the task requires that the
agent `remember' the object category also after it has stopped its dynamical interactions with the object,
it seems that an agent without internal states cannot solve it. A task with similar characteristics can
8be obtained by just slightly changing the behavior that is required from the agent: instead of avoiding
diamonds and catching circles, you just need to ask the agent to move as leftward as possible with circles
and as rightward as possible with diamonds. In this way, once the agent has categorized the object and
moves towards the appropriate direction, the object disappears from sight. In such a situation, in order
for the agent to keep on moving correctly it seems to require some form of memory about which kind of
object it has interacted with.
In order to `empirically' test whether such a simple modication would indeed be sucient for making
the task more representationally-hungry (according to our operational threshold), I ran another set of
simulations in which the agents' neural networks have no internal units and the categorization task is
changed accordingly. In particular, in this new experiment everything runs as in the previous simulation
except for the tness function. In this case, the contribution to tness in each trial i is computed as
follows: pi = 1   di for a circular object and pi = di for diamonds, where di is the normalized distance
between the agent and the left wall of the environment when the vertical separation between the agent
and the falling object goes to 06.
The results of the simulations conrm our analysis. Indeed, purely reactive agents are not able to
evolve a successful strategy: in this case over 10 evolutionary runs the best evolved agent reached a
tness of 0.675 on the 50 evaluation trials, and a mean performance of 0.5985 on a test on 1000 new
randomly generated trials. Agent's behavior has little to do with categorization: it tends always to move
leftward, while, sometimes it centers the object when it falls from the left. As a result, the discrete
average performance of this agent is 0.56, meaning that the ability of the agent to categorize objects is
just very slightly higher than chance level.
6 Representations, at last
The slightly modied task just described is considerably more relevant for a discussion about representa-
tion than the original one, as it seems to require the possession of internal states to be solved (of course,
it is possible that other kinds of neural networks without hidden states but, for example, with a memory
of the motor states might be able to solve the task; nonetheless, if we do not provide this kind of infor-
mation to the network, the previous simulation shows that this task requires internal states). So, I ran a
nal set of evolutionary experiments in which the neural network is that of the original task (with three
fully recurrent internal units) but the task is the slightly modied one, i.e. going to the left for circles
and to the right for diamonds. Agents provided with internal states are able to eciently solve the task:
over 10 evolutionary runs the best evolved agent reached a tness of 0.923 on the 50 evaluation trials,
and a mean performance of 0.8985 on 1000 new randomly generated trials (discrete average performance
= 1). Now we can apply the two tests for assessing the presence of representations to the best evolved
agent in this task. The results are shown in Fig. 4 and 5. As in the original experiment, the internal
state of the agent always ends up in one of two very small regions of its state space depending on the
object the agent has interacted with (Fig. 4). But, contrary to what happened to the agent of the original
experiment, in this case the internal state correlating with the object's category consistently guides the
agent's behavior in a way that is appropriate to what it correlates with (i.e. the category).
If we impose this internal state before the agent has interacted with the object (i.e. at the beginning
of a trial), the internal state is maintained constant during the whole trial (Fig. 5)7. As a result, the agent
always produces the appropriate behavior: moving leftward in case of circles and rightward in case of
diamonds. Indeed, the performance in these tests is even signicantly better (0.9568) than in the normal
tests (0.8985). The reason is clear: since in this case the agent `knows' from the beginning of the trial
which object is present, it can directly produce the appropriate behavior without wasting time in actively
scanning the object in order to discover its category, as it needs to do in normal trials. Hence, the two
attractors in the agent's internal state space satisfy both the criteria for representationhood: they both
(a) correlate with a feature in the environment that is relevant for the agent's survival and reproduction
(i.e. the category of falling object), and (b) guide agent's behavior in a way which is adaptive with respect
to that feature (i.e. moving leftward or rightward).
Having discovered that our agent solves its task by relying on internal representations we can use this
knowledge to make predictions about the agent's behavior. For example, we can predict that if the agent
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Fig. 4. Correlation test for the modied experiment
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Fig. 5. Representation test for the modied experiment
`thinks' that a circle is present in its environment (i.e. if its internal state is the one representing circles)
it will behave accordingly, irrespectively of the eective presence of a circle. I tested this prediction
by running another set of 50 trials in which I impose, at the beginning of the trial, the internal state
representing the wrong object. The prediction was veried: in the 100% of cases the agent behaved in
a way which was appropriate to the category of the (wrongly) represented object, and not to the one
actually present in the environment. As a result, the resulting average performance was 0.0448 (discrete
average performance = 0).
7 Discussion
Understanding the role (if any) that the concept of representation might play in the future science
of behavior is one of the most important, fundamental problems facing the emerging framework of
embodied cognition. To make progress in this endeavor, in the present article I have followed the approach
recently proposed by one of the most inuential representational skeptics, that is Randall Beer (Beer,
1996, 2000, 2003b): instead of continuing to argue endlessly on the base of intuitions and speculations,
build articial, idealized models of agents capable of minimally cognitive behaviors, and then assess
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whether their internal states can be meaningfully considered to involve `representations'. In this spirit,
I looked for the presence of representations in evolved agents which had to solve Beer's well-known
categorical perception experiment. In order to do that, I had to operationalized a fairly standard concept
of representations (Clark, 1997b; Bechtel, 1998; Beer, 2003b) according to which an internal state can
be considered a representation if (a) it tends to correlate with some relevant (for the agent) feature of
the environment and (b) it contributes to agent's behavior in a way which is functional to the feature
with which it correlates. While I was able to nd states satisfying (a), criterion (b) was not met, thus
supporting Beer's view that no representations could be found in these agents. On the other hand,
the successful replication of the same experiments with agents whose controller did not possess any
internal state and hence could not have internal representations by denition questioned the relevance
of the chosen task for a fair assessment of the representational issue. A simple, slight modication of the
original task made it unsolvable by agents with no internal states, and consequently much more suitable
for our purposes. The assessment of the presence of representations in agents provided with internal
states able to solve the modied task gave positive results: in this case, I found internal states that not
only correlated with environmental features of the environment, but also guided agent's behavior in a
way that was functional with respect to those features, thus meeting both above-mentioned criteria for
representationhood.
A few points still need to be claried. First, the operationalization of the concept of representation
I have provided is surely very limited and simple. In fact, I do not consider it as a full-blown denition
of representation, but rather as a working characterization with which we can at least ground future
research on the topic. Indeed, the most important role that this characterization is supposed to play in
the debate on representations is that of preventing any future complaint that the notion of representation
is too vague and malleable to be of any use in a rational debate (e.g. Harvey, 1996; Cli and Noble, 1997;
Haselager et al., 2003; Beer, 2003b). My operationalization can no doubt be improved, but it has at least
three undeniable merits: (1) it is not vacuous, (2) it is in line with the standard, pre-theoretic notion
of representation, and (3) it can be used for assessing the presence (or absence!) of representations in
embodied agents.
Second, the notion of internal representation I have discussed in this paper is not only meaningful
and applicable, it is also predictive, and hence it can be protably used for understanding an agent's
behavior. For example, in the last simulation I have successfully tested the prediction that the agent
would behave according to its internal representation of objects irrespective of whether the object is
actually present in the environment. This kind of test demonstrates another feature which is considered
to be characteristic of representations, that is the possibility to have wrong representations : \it seems an
essential aspect of representation that misrepresentation is possible" (Bechtel, 1998, pag. 298; see also,
for example, Millikan, 1984; Cummins, 1989).
Third, it is probably worth clarifying the relationships between the broad notion of representation
that has been used in this paper and narrower notions. For example, Clark and Grush (1999) distinguish
between a weak and a strong sense of representations (see also Clark, 1997b): for a state to classify as a
representation in the weak sense, only adaptive functional correlation is required; while representations in
the strong sense are \inner items capable of playing their roles in the absence of the on-going perceptual
inputs that ordinarily allow us to key our actions to our world." (pag. 9). This stronger notion is in line
with the idea that representations are related to the internal tracking of things that are currently absent
(Haugeland, 1991; Smith, 1996). Clark and Grush introduced the distinction in order to discriminate
between the kind of inner states that might be present in systems like the one I analyzed in the present
paper and the inner states of an emulator in the control-theoretic sense: i.e. states that constitute
predictions of the perceptual consequences of the system's actions. This notwithstanding, it is interesting
to note that in order to make my agent develop internal representations (in the weak sense), I modied
the original task so that the agent had to behave appropriately to the object's category even when not
directly perceiving the object. This prevented the possibility for the agent to rely on a purely sensory-
motor reactive strategy: in fact, the category of the perceived object had to be internally stored so that
the agent might keep on producing the appropriate behavior after the object had exited the agent's visual
eld. In other words, the function of my agent's representational states is just to play the role of stand-ins
for the category of the perceived object when the object is absent to the agent no longer providing any
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perceptual input. Hence, our minimalist simulations seem to demonstrate that it is possible to have an
agent possessing \full-blooded" representations (in the strong sense of Clark and Grush) without having
coupled inverse and forward models, as the emulator theory of representations suggests (Grush, 2004).
To clarify my position: I agree that there are good reasons to believe that something like emulators
developed in real animals for motor control and that they also might play a fundamental role in higher
level cognitive activities (Barsalou, 1999; Hesslow, 2002; Grush, 2004; Pezzulo, 2008), but the usefulness
of the (broader) concept of representation is not limited to the cases in which emulations (or simulations)
are present.
Fourth, the previous issue is related to another general point that is worth clarifying. Most accounts of
representations involve references to some kind of `cognizer' to which representations must be delivered in
order for their representational status to be considered as eective. This is consistent with the intuitive
notion that the representational status of a given entity crucially depends on the `consumer' of the
representation: the same object, action, or event can represent dierent things (including no-thing) to
dierent agents. It is on this grounds that representational skeptic Inman Harvey stated that \when
talking of representation it is imperative to make clear who the users of the representation are" (Harvey,
1996). How does our approach deal with the problem of identifying the user of the representation? The
rst thing to consider is that if the suggested `cognizer' is taken too literally (as it is typically done), it
just begs the question about representationhood: in its cognitive activities the cognizer would need to
manipulate its own representations, thus requiring another sub-cognizer to which its own representations
have to be delivered, and so on. If one wants to escape from an innite regress, there must be a nal 'user'
of the representation that is simple enough not to contain any representation (the potential problem of
innite regress in cognitive explanations is well-known in the philosophy of mind: for a valuable discussion,
see, for example, Dennett, 1978). In this respect, a simple three-layer neural network like the one used in
this work can be conceived as being composed of two sub-systems: the rst, consisting of the connection
weights linking the input to the hidden units plus the recurrent connections in the hidden layer, is the
part of the system that `produces' the representations; the second, consisting of the connection weights
linking the hidden to the output units, is the part of the system that `uses' the representations produced
by the other sub-system. This way of framing the problem is interesting because, on the one hand, it
satises the intuition that representations require a user (and thus responds to Harvey's concerns); on the
other, it demonstrates that this requirement does not necessarily lead to an innite regress of homunculi
inside the cognitive system.
Fifth, I think that the exercise of looking for representations in a principled way has proved to be
quite instructive and rewarding. For example, it has permitted us to verify once again that there are
cognitively interesting tasks, like the original categorization task, that can be solved by relying only on
purely sensory-motor reactive processes (for previous demonstration of this point see, for example, Harvey
et al., 1994; Nol, 1997; Scheier et al., 1998; Floreano et al., 2004). It has also allowed us to discover that
other tasks, like the modied task involving memory, are much less tractable with purely sensory-motor
strategies (on this point, see also Nol, 2002; Mirolli et al., 2010). Furthermore, and most importantly,
our exercise has made us discover another interesting fact: agents endowed with internal states that
have to solve the rst kind of simpler tasks tend to rely on sensory-motor strategies and not develop
internal representational states. On the other hand, the results of our last simulations suggest that agents
dealing with more complex tasks that can't be solved by relying on purely sensory-motor strategies might
indeed tend to develop internal states to which we can ascribe a representational status. However, it is
important to remember that on the question which kind of tasks requires which kind of ability we can
only provide partial indications of general tendencies: denite conclusions and general rules can seldom,
if ever, be drawn. To clarify: my simulations demonstrate that, in this particular case, making the task
more memory-hungry resulted in making it more representationally hungry. This by no means implies
that all and only the tasks that require some form of memory need internal representations to be solved.
As discussed above, articial life / evolutionary robotic research has already suciently demonstrated
that our intuitions on what is the space of possible solutions to a given task can be completely wrong,
and that whether or not a task requires representations (and which kind of representations) cannot in
general be established a priori. The only thing we can do is to keep on investigating, both through
real experimentation and through simplied computational models, which kinds of tasks tend to require
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which kinds of abilities. In this respect, our simulations do suggest that memory-hungry tasks tend to be
representationally-hungry. But clearly much more work has to be done in order to nd out which kinds
of task tend to promote or even require the development of internal representations and which ones do
not. And I think that the kind of idealized models that have been used in this paper constitute very
appropriate tools for investigating this kind of issues.
Finally, it might be useful to briey clarify my position with respect to the standard account of
representations in Cognitive Science. The view of cognition that is emerging from embodied, situated,
dynamical approaches strongly contrasts the old view that cognition can be understood as the manip-
ulation of the kind of objective, discrete, abstract, amodal, rule-governed representations assumed by
classical cognitive science. Indeed, even though it is possible that some aspects of cognitive activity might
involve the use of internal representations that have some of the features of the representations assumed
by classical cognitive science, as argued, for example, by Markman and Dietrich (2000b,a), I think that
the best way to understand high-level human cognition is to investigate how lower-level sub-symbolic
cognitive functions are transformed by the internalization of `cognitive tricks' mediated by language.
The idea, originally developed by Vygotsky in the 1930s (Vygotsky, 1978) and recently re-proposed in
cognitive-science oriented philosophy of mind (Dennett, 1991, 1993; Clark, 1997b, 2006) and in several
areas of psychology (e.g. Gentner, 2003; Spelke, 2003; Tomasello, 2003), is that human cognition depends
on the internalization of the social interactions that a developing child has with adults and more skillful
peers. The behavior of the child is continually inuenced by social interactions, typically mediated by
language, that help the child in solving all kinds of (cognitive) tasks: linguistic social aid helps the child
in learning how to categorize experiences, to focus attention on important aspects of the environment,
to memorize and recall useful information, to inhibit un-appropriate spontaneous behavior, to construct
plans for solving complex tasks, and so on. During development the child learns to rehearse the social
linguistic aid when faced with similar tasks all alone, and then, when the linguistic self-aid has been
mastered, private speech is internalized, thus becoming inner speech. If this analysis is correct, human
cognition just seems to be constituted by language-like symbol manipulation because it is the result of
the transformation of sub-symbolic embodied and dynamic processes by internalized linguistic social aids
(for more detailed discussions of these ideas, see Mirolli and Parisi, 2009, 2010; for preliminary modeling
works along these lines, see Schyns, 1991; Cangelosi and Harnad, 2000; Steels, 2003b; Clowes and Morse,
2005; Lupyan, 2005; Mirolli and Parisi, 2005a,b, 2006).
8 Conclusion
The main goal of the present paper was to show that the new embodied cognitive science is not in
contrast with the idea of internal representations per se, but only with the symbolic representations that
were prototypical of classical cognitive explanations. If this is the case, as I hope I have demonstrated,
what must be done in order to further develop the new embodied cognitive science is to stop quarreling
about the necessity of the concept of representation in general and to focus on the development of new
ideas and theories regarding the kinds of representations that embodied systems might need to use for
solving their cognitive tasks. Indeed, new ideas should be developed in order to re-think all aspects of
representationhood, including:
1. What is represented: not the world as it is but rather possibilities for action, ways of interacting with
the environment, and so on. This idea is in line with the recent psychological research on the notion
of aordance (Gibson, 1979; Tucker and Ellis, 2001; Caligiore et al., 2010), with the neuroscientic
ndings related to canonical neurons (Rizzolatti et al., 1988; Jeannerod et al., 1995; Murata et al.,
1997; Rizzolatti and Sinigaglia, 2008), and with the notions of `pushmi-pullyu' or `action-oriented'
representations proposed by several philosophers (e.g. Millikan, 1996; Clark, 1997a).
2. How things are represented: not through language-like, amodal symbols but rather through action-
related and/or modality-specic vehicles. Several recent proposals in both psychology and neuro-
science support this view: see, for example, the various concepts of `embodied memories' (Glenberg,
1997), `perceptual symbol systems' (Barsalou, 1999; Prinz and Barsalou, 2000), `sensory-motor emu-
lators' (Grush, 2004), and 'mental simulations' (Jeannerod, 2006). An important issue is to investigate
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the form that such kinds of representational vehicles may take: patterns of neural activations, trajec-
tories of patterns of activations, attractor states... (see ,e.g. Rumelhart et al., 1986b; Elman, 1990;
Spencer and Schoner, 2003; Gigliotta and Nol, 2008).
3. How representations are created: not through the passive processing of static perceptions but rather
through an active process that strongly relies on the dynamical interactions with the environment.
Again. several lines of research point in this direction (see, for example Yarbus, 1967; Ballard, 1991;
Churchland et al., 1994; Findlay and Gilchrist, 2003; Noe, 2004; Mirolli et al., 2010).
4. How to study and understand all this: there is indeed an urgent need to develop not only new theories
and new concepts, but also new experimental and computational methods for studying and analyzing
embodied cognitive behavior.
I endorse that this endeavor will require the fruitful collaboration between open-minded philosophers,
psychologists, neuroscientists, and computational modelers.
Notes
1It might be also useful to clarify from the very beginning what I do not do here. In particular, I do not
argue for the dynamical, embodied, situated cognition approach to cognitive science. Here, I just take the view
which considers cognition as \environmentally embedded, corporeally embodied, and neurally embrained" (van
Gelder, 1999, pag. 244) for granted, and contribute to the debate about whether such a view implies a rejection
of the notion of representation or not. For detailed discussions in favor of the embodied approach to cognition,
see, for example, (Varela et al., 1991; Thelen and Smith, 1994; Port and van Gelder, 1995; Clark, 1997a; Pfeifer
and Scheier, 1999; Beer, 2000; Pfeifer and Bongard, 2006). Furthermore, I do not aim at providing a theory of
representations and representational content, as many others have been doing (e.g. Fodor, 1981; Millikan, 1984;
Dretske, 1988; Cummins, 1989; Barsalou, 1999; Bickhard, 1999; Grush, 2004; Pezzulo, 2008). I just take the
pre-theoretic, intuitive concept of representation that seems to be shared by most (if not all) authors discussing
about representations, I operationalize it, and I use this operationalization to assess whether minimally cognitive
situated embodied agents can be meaningfully ascribed representational states.
2I will use the term `feature' to refer to any possible content of a representation: objects, categories, events,
actions, contexts... Indeed, one of the most fundamental and challenging issues on representation is to understand
what, if anything, is represented.
3I what follows, even when I use the term `representation' without further qualications I actually mean
`internal representation', where with `internal' I just mean `in between the input and output of a system'. This
is just to clarify that here we are not interested in external representations like paintings, writings, signs posed
in the environment, and so on, nor in cases in which an embodied agent uses \the world as its own best model"
(Brooks, 1990). Here we are exclusively dealing with the psychological notion of `representation' as an internal
stand-in for external reality. Hence, an agent that has no internal states, like the one that will be described in
section 5, cannot, by denition, have representations in our sense
4The idea of looking at the pattern of activations of the hidden units for candidate representations in a neural
network is certainly not new: rather, it is the standard approach in connectionist research at least since the
seminal paper by Rumelhart et al. 1986a. The only dierence of our work with respect to the connectionist
literature is that our neural network is embodied, that is it controls the behavior of an agent that interacts with
its environment. With respect to the representational issue this can make a big dierence.
In a dis-embodied system like a classical connectionist network the `behavior' of the network corresponds
to the single output pattern given by the network in response to a single input pattern. In order to behave
correctly the network has to transform the patterns in the input units, which might not correlate appropriately
with the required response, in patterns in the hidden units that do correlate with the required output, so that
the appropriate output can be provided. Hence, in such dis-embodied systems, one can be almost certain that,
as long as the system behaves correctly, internal representation can be found, because the activation patterns in
(sub-sets of) the hidden units will certainly (a) correlate with something relevant { i.e. the category of the input
that determines what is the appropriate response { and (b) contribute to drive the output of the system in a
manner that is appropriate to what they correlate with { because the appropriate response depends just on those
patterns.
Taking into account embodiment makes two critical dierences with respect to the issue of representations.
First, the presence of an internal state that would be classied as a representation cannot be taken for granted
any more, because in an embodied system behaviors crucially depend not just on internal states, but rather on
the dynamical interactions between the system and its environment. Then, in contrast with dis-embodied neural
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networks, in which appropriate responses must depend on `meaningful' internal states, in embodied systems the
dynamical interactions with the environment can, at least in principle, result in adaptive behavior without any
internal state correlating with any relevant feature of the environment. This is the ground on which proponents
of embodied cognition and/or of the dynamical approach has based their skeptical challenge to the notion of
representation. Second, in an embodied system there is no longer a single internal state that corresponds to a
single input and to a single response. This is why in order to search for internal representations we need to look
at the whole sequence of internal states produced during the agent's interaction with the environment and try to
nd a sub-set of such states that does correlate with something relevant in the environment.
Finally, the idea of looking for representations in the (dynamics of the) patterns of activations of a neural
network's hidden units is also in line with what happens in neuroscience. When looking for internal representations
in real brains the vast majority of neuroscientists look at correlations between external events and the frequencies
of spikes (ring rate) of neurons, which is just what the activation of an articial neuron corresponds to. There
are other, complementary proposals, according to which some information in the brain might be passed through
the timing of single spikes, or through the synchronization between neurons or groups of neurons (see, for example
Singer, 1999; VanRullen et al., 2005). Although this is certainly an interesting possibility which merits further
investigation, such coding cannot have any correspondent in neural network models in which neurons are ring
rate units and do not have spikes. Since our model is of this latter kind, it simply cannot represent through
spikes, and candidate representations can only be found in the patterns of activations of the hidden units.
5Note that, in line with the intuitive notion of representation that we are trying to operationalize here, this
second criterion for representationhood is purely behavioral, and does not make any assumption with respect to
what should be happening inside the system. The internal state might be a point attractor that never changes
throughout the trial, it might follow a cyclic trajectory, or it might (at least in theory) even change chaotically. As
far as our criterion for representationhood is concerned, the only thing that matters is that the internal state leads
to an external behavior that is appropriate with respect to the object category that is is supposed to represent
(either circle or diamond)
6It is important to bear in mind that this modication to the task for increasing its representational hungry-
ness is not the only one possible: it is only the simplest and most straightforward that could do the required job.
In particular, though I made the task more representationally-hungry by making it more memory-hungry, this
must not be taken to imply that there is a special, necessary relationship between the need of representations and
the need of memory. Indeed, there may very well be tasks that do not require memory but that are nonetheless
representationally-hungry, and, viceversa, tasks that require some form of memory that do not require represen-
tations. Neither our operational criteria for representationhood nor the operational threshold for representational
hungryness make any reference to the need of memory. It just happened that, in this particular case, adding
a need for memory in the task was sucient for making it pass the operational threshold for representational
hungryness.
7The fact that the internal states that do qualify as representations are states that are maintained constant
throughout the trial is contingent to this particular case, and must not be considered as necessarily related to
representationhood. Our operational criteria for representationhood do not mention any stability requirement.
Hence, there may well be internal states that are not enduring but that qualify as representations and, viceversa,
it is certainly possible to have enduring internal states that do not possess the requisites for qualifying as
representations. For example, even the states that were tested for representationhood in the original task in
section 4 happened to be maintained relatively constant during the trial (see gure 3), but they did not pass the
test for representationhood.
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